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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the politics of dual citizenship in Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). While the immigrants in Taiwan are proposing to 
expand the privileged right of dual citizenship to non-Republic of China (ROC) 
nationals, the Chinese emigrants are demanding the right to retain their Chinese 
citizenship on their acquisition of foreign citizenship. Despite the continuous 
lobbying, both governments are reluctant to liberalise their existing citizenship 
law. The liberal preposition which situates dual citizenship in a human rights 
framework is unacceptable to both states. This article suggests that the political 
cultures of Taiwan and China are incompatible with the liberalist approach of 
citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL 
AND THE STATE 
 
  
A common feature shared by the dual citizenship debates in Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) is the issue of individual rights. The 
nascent citizenship debates in Taiwan focus on the right to equal treatment 
of dual citizenship between foreigners and Republic of China (ROC) 
citizens. In Taiwan, the use of ethnicity as a main criterion for dual 
citizenship creates different categories of citizens; those who do enjoy the 
best of both worlds and those who do not. In other words, there are different 
levels of dual citizenship tolerance. Applying the term "selective tolerance" 
(Górny et al. 2007), we could classify Taiwanese citizens into three broad 
categories in terms of their eligibility of dual citizenship: local Taiwanese, 
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government officers and immigrants. Among them, only local Taiwanese 
could enjoy the best of both worlds. This selective tolerance was originally 
motivated by the official need to maintain the imaginary Chinese nation. 
Such partial policy is difficult to reconcile when immigration and 
democratisation took place on the island during the 1980s.  
Taiwan's citizenship case is distinctive as Taiwan allows its own 
citizens to possess a foreign citizenship without forfeiting their ROC 
citizenship but the same practice is not acceptable in the case of its 
immigrants. This so-called practice of "double standard" between its birth 
citizens and naturalised citizens is particularly obvious in a family with 
foreign spouses, in which Taiwanese spouses and their children may be able 
to acquire dual citizenship, whereas the foreign spouses may not. The 
proposal to drop the dual citizenship restriction has "long been due, and will 
be warmly welcomed by many long-term foreign residents of Taiwan" 
(Whittle 2012). Immigrants in Taiwan are not entitled to citizenship rights 
even though they have stayed in Taiwan for generations and married a 
Taiwanese citizen, except if they renounce their original citizenship. 
 The PRC, on the other hand, is witnessing an increased demand from 
its overseas population for the right to retain their Chinese citizenship on 
their acquisition of foreign citizenship. Unlike Taiwan, China prohibits dual 
citizenship even for its own citizens. The PRC's principle applies equally to 
all citizens or foreigners who are seeking naturalisation. Returning PRC 
migrants (Haigui) are placed in a precarious situation, described by Ho as 
"caught between the two worlds." They face a citizenship dilemma as they 
return to reside in their former country which they no longer have any rights 
(2011: 643). According to the PRC single citizenship principle, the returned 
overseas Chinese were no longer PRC nationals if they had obtained foreign 
citizenship (Wang et al. 2006: 302). As foreigners in their motherland, 
former PRC nationals do not have the right to stay in China without 
applying for appropriate visas like employer-sponsored visa, self-
employment visa, spousal visa or visitor visa. Haigui underwent 
inconveniences and difficulties in terms of obtaining entry permits and 
extending their stays (Ho 2011: 650). In Ho's words, "They have limited 
rights in the place they are compelled to return because of disappointing job 
prospects in Canada and/or familial commitments in China" (655). 
 In both cases, Taiwanese immigrants and PRC returned migrants are 
hoping to increase their mobility and social rights beyond the national 
boundaries. Migrants, because of aspiring transnational mobility and 
retaining family-based national affiliation, stand against the state's demand 
of singular loyalty (Fong 2011: 52). This article presents a debate between 
the state (disallowing dual citizenship because of the desire of singular 
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loyalty) and the individual (aspiring dual citizenship because of 
entitlement). It offers an explanation of why the liberal theory of citizenship 
could not be applied in the Taiwanese and Chinese context.  Accepting dual 
citizenship as human rights is a contested position in both states. Valuable 
insights can be gleaned through the comparison between the Taiwanese 
citizenship development—which witnesses the extension of citizenship 
rights as a result of the democratisation process—and the Chinese 
citizenship tradition, which prioritises the interests of the society over the 
rights of the individual (Goldman and Perry 2002; Rigger 2002). The idea of 
having the best of both worlds and possessing divided allegiance would be 
contradictory to the growth of Taiwanese nationalism. The natural rights 
theory would be irreconcilable with the Marxist-Leninist collectivist 
understanding of rights in the PRC. I propose that the political cultures of 
Taiwan and China are incompatible with the liberalist approach of 
citizenship. 
 This article contextualises the dual citizenship debates from the right-
based citizenship conception. It begins with a review of the liberalist 
approach. Next, it examines the struggles for the right to have dual 
citizenship right in Taiwan and the PRC. It then discusses how the migrants 
adopted strategic approaches to maximise their rights and interests. Finally, 
this article assesses the tensions between state's interests and the individual's 
interests in explaining why Taiwan and the PRC are reluctant to accept dual 
citizenship as an individual right. Throughout this paper, two groups of 
migrants will be examined for their granted or denied access to dual 
citizenship in Taiwan: foreign immigrants in Taiwan (including business 
people and female immigrant spouses); and Taiwanese emigrants (including 
those who serve in the government). In the Chinese case, the groups of 
migrants examined are Chinese students and professionals who have 
acquired foreign citizenship as well as the returned Chinese migrants. 
 
 
LIBERALISM: MAXIMISING CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS IN THE ERA 
OF TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY 
 
The framework for the right-based citizenship conception was first 
developed by T. H. Marshall in his pioneering work, Class, Citizenship and 
Social Development, in which Marshall classified citizenship according to 
three elements of civic, political and social rights. Individual freedom such 
as freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, to 
conclude contracts and the right to justice are civil rights, while 
participation through the exercise of political power constitutes a political 
IJAPS, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1–33, 2015         Liberalising Dual Citizenship 
4 
element. The social dimension includes access to economic welfare, 
security, education system and social services (1965: 78–79). The right-
based citizenship conception places emphasis on maximising individual 
liberty (Schuck 2002: 132). 
 Liberals strongly advanced that dual citizenship should be protected 
as a human right (Spiro 2010: 111; Blatter 2008: 10; Faist 2007: 174). Dual 
citizenship is desirable since it facilitates the acquisition of individuals' legal 
and political rights beyond the boundary of a state (Blatter 2008: 10–11). 
The combined forces of increased mobility across the globe and the growing 
human right regime render multiple citizenship an irresistible force (Faist 
2007: 173). Isin and Turner suggested that the rights of mobility and its 
ensuing rights of dual citizenship are exceptionally relevant in the era of 
globalisation (2007: 5). Spiro is right to point out that the price of 
renunciation is high for material and sentimental interests. Material costs are 
high as they involve political leverage, ownership of property, entry rights 
and socioeconomic benefits. However, Spiro acknowledges that the 
sentimental costs involved are "more prevalent." The renunciation of birth 
right citizenship is a very tough decision as it is "dearer" than the other 
(2010: 124, 128). Plural citizenship works perfectly to the individual 
interests. A second citizenship offers some added benefits without costing 
any additional obligations. What Spiro described as "free" citizenship 
nowadays could be obtained at a zero cost. This is attributed to the fact that 
many states have abandoned military obligations and charged taxes based 
on residence (127).  
 Dual citizenship is increasingly viewed positively in terms of state 
interests.  For the sending states, dual citizenship is advantageous in terms 
of economic benefits. Emigrants contribute to foreign exchange and 
entrepreneurial capital while reversing the brain drain phenomenon. For the 
receiving states, the acceptance of dual citizenship among immigrants 
lowers the barrier to naturalisation and facilitates integration (Spiro 2010: 
117). The liberal theory of citizenship advocates low barriers to 
naturalisation. Naturalisation should be facilitated for those who are 
"territorially present." States should take a permissive stance on dual 
citizenship to enable those who are "territorially present" to participate in 
self governance since they are affected by the decision of the state. 
Opportunity to participate in self-governance should also be given to those 
who have settled permanently (Spiro 2010: 124). Public deliberations are 
the means for improving the quality of democracy. Allowing dual 
citizenship would give resident foreigners a chance to be heard in public 
deliberation. The expansion and diversification of the audience of public 
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deliberation contributes to a better quality of policy making (Janoski and 
Gran 2002: 25–26).   
 Immigration countries have adopted a more inclusive version of 
citizenship legislations, which resulted in the expansion of individual rights. 
Meanwhile, emigration countries also show a growing tolerance of dual 
citizenship to maintain transnational links with their emigrants. The 
governments acknowledge the "multiples ties" of citizens to promote their 
economic interests (Faist 2007: 5–6). As pointed out by Isin and Turner, 
dual citizenship is "becoming a strategy of government." Pointing to the 
examples of India and Australia, which have embraced dual-citizenship for 
strategic reasons, they suggested that "modern China may well wish to give 
some political status, such as dual citizenship, to overseas Chinese to attract 
wealthy Chinese businessmen back into the fold" (2007: 11). If the direct 
and full recognition of dual citizenship is unacceptable, another alternative 
is through indirect recognition and flexible dual citizenship policy. Various 
states have practiced a more flexible dual citizenship policy.  
India, for example, passed the Indian Citizenship (Amendment) Act 
in 2003 which allowed dual citizenship for Indians in Europe, America and 
Southeast Asia. The Act granted Overseas Indian Citizenship to People of 
Indian Origin (PIO) in 16 countries. Those with the status of Overseas 
Indian Citizenship were granted limited citizenship rights as dual nationals 
in terms of ownership of real estate, investment and financing privileges. 
Dual nationals were not entitled to vote, to stand for election or to hold 
public office. This dual citizenship approach facilitates overseas Indian 
investment and the return of overseas Indians. At the same time, it protects 
India's national interests and national security. It avoids citizenship conflicts 
with other states since Indian dual nationals do not have any political rights 
or obligations to India (Chaturvedi 2005: 160; Varadarajan 2010: 138). 
Economic factors were the main reasons why India amended its single 
citizenship policy, which had been practiced for more than 50 years. When 
India faced financial crisis in 1991, the government looked upon an 
economic liberalisation programme as the solution, rather than seeking IMF 
funding. This was achieved by encouraging the involvement of overseas 
Indians in Indian economic development by offering more incentives and 
opening up new investment sectors (Varadarajan 2010: 107). In 2005, an 
amendment to the India Citizenship Law extended Overseas Indian 
Citizenship to People of Indian Origin in Spain, Russia, Nigeria and 
Lebanon. To avoid conflicts with states which prohibited dual citizenship, 
the law excluded overseas Indian staying in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Fiji, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago (212). 
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Mexico is another state which had long prohibited dual citizenship but 
has recently changed its policy. The new Mexican nationality law of 1998 
distinguished between Mexican nationality and full Mexican citizenship. 
The nationals of Mexico holding dual citizenship were not entitled to vote 
or hold public office. Though their status was different from the citizens of 
Mexico, their status was better compared with foreigners since they had the 
right to own and inherit property (Martin 2002: 34). In Turkey, the 
government amended its law to enable former Turkish citizens who had 
obtained foreign citizenship to enjoy citizenship rights in Turkey. The "pink 
card" system was introduced in 1995 to protect the citizenship rights of 
Turkish emigrants, since Turkish citizens who had migrated to a foreign 
country and obtained a foreign citizenship would lose their Turkish 
citizenship with all their rights in Turkey. The holders of pink cards enjoyed 
the same rights as other Turkish citizens with the exception of voting, 
holding public office or serving in the armed forces (Keyman and Içduygu 
2003: 200). Faist reminded us that though Mexico, India and Turkey have 
recognised dual citizenship, the rights enjoyed by citizens with dual 
citizenship are limited. The states do not permit such citizens to exercise 
political rights (2000: 271–272). 
The examples of Mexico, India and Turkey have shown that 
globalisation has made "economic calculation" an important consideration 
in the ways nation-states redefine citizenship laws (Ong 1999: 112). The 
PRC and Taiwan are also strategising on forging strong transnational 
linkages with their diaspora. Unlike the above mentioned examples, the 
PRC is responding to globalisation and transnationalism without 
challenging the state's single citizenship principle. China has attempted to 
reverse the brain drain by encouraging the return of ethnic Chinese 
professionals in the Silicon Valley. Chinese cities are competing with the 
other Asian cities to lure back its overseas educated migrants and other 
talented foreigners through the offering of work and visiting visas, which 
could be converted into the status of permanent residence. As a part of the 
competitive policies, Chinese diaspora is welcome with "well paid and 
prestigious jobs, luxurious apartments and villas, as well as special 
'returning entrepreneurial' centres in the cities" (Ong 2008: 84–85). Living 
in megacities and enjoying luxurious lifestyle, these skilled emigrants have 
access to something, which might not be accessible to urban Chinese 
citizens. It is debatable whether or not they own their loyalty to the state in 
spite being given the advantages of first class urban citizens. Aihwa Ong 
suggested that the megacity "is increasingly less relevant as a site for 
distinguishing between the rights of citizens and those of talented outsiders" 
(89). 
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Moreover, it is the PRC which reaches out to its overseas nationals 
and rouses their patriotism to China's economic advantages. By using a 
shared ethnicity to seek cultural and national allegiance from the new 
migrants (Xinyimin) as well as favourable investment conditions, the PRC 
successfully incorporated these migrants into its developing global market 
economy. Duara (2003: 16) has coined the term "de-territorialised ideology 
of nationalism" to refer to the Chinese strategy of claiming the allegiance of 
ethnic Chinese beyond the Chinese border in its quest for global 
competitiveness. Chinese historian Liu Hong applauded the PRC's 
nationalistic strategy of evoking Chineseness as the shared cultural identity 
while adeptly claiming a national identity beyond the fixed territory (Liu 
2010: 187). 
 The PRC is not following the example of other nations which 
recognise dual citizenship to attract talented foreign scientists. The PRC had 
adopted another approach—the green card system—which allows foreign 
citizens to have permanent residence rights (China Daily 31 December 
2004). In August 2004, the PRC implemented a permanent residence (PR) 
system which was comparable to the green card system of the United States. 
Though the new PR system allowed foreign citizens, regardless of their 
ethnicity, to apply for PR, the criteria for the acquisition of PR were very 
strict: only those who had made important contributions to the country were 
eligible. Only a small number of foreigners had PR status (Wang et al. 2006: 
302). This is understandable as the system aimed to attract more expertise, 
skills and investments. In addition to experts and scholars, the system also 
granted PR status to those who have made significant investments in China. 
Some scholars have urged a relaxation of the criteria and scope of China's 
green card system to include more of those who wish to return home (Liu 
2008: 134). Though the system was very selective and competitive, it 
enabled overseas Chinese with foreign citizenship to stay and work in China 
without forfeiting their foreign citizenship. The PR system permitted the 
PRC to stick to its single citizenship policy while preventing citizenship 
conflicts (Choe 2006: 101–102).  
As far as the Chinese migrants are concerned, this phenomenon is 
also not a satisfactory arrangement. Migrants prefer a full-fledged 
citizenship status in both political entities. Permanent residence is not 
comparable to a full-fledged citizenship, not from the aspect of rights and 
obligations, but from the viewpoints of "a sense of belonging." While access 
to social rights is important to the migrants, it is not as important as ties to 
the familial lineage. This lead Çaglar (2002) to conclude that there was 
something lacking in the status of permanence resident, that of the inherent 
ties that citizenship encompasses.  
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"Citizenship is not a simple cluster of rights, it stands for 
something whose value cannot be comprehended solely as the 
rights granted to members and denied to aliens. Other than 
rights (and duties), there is something else involved in 
citizenship… it entails substantial ties to fellow citizens" (254).  
 
For the PRC, dual state membership in the forms of quasi-citizenship, dual 
citizenship and flexible citizenship is unacceptable. Non-recognition of dual 
citizenship is applied equally. In Taiwanese case, dual citizenship is applied 
selectively to different categories of people. In fact, preferential treatment in 
dual citizenship is not unique to Taiwan. "Selective tolerance" is coined by 
Górny et al. (2007: 147) to describe the different level of tolerance of dual 
citizenship in Poland. Selected groups are given the privileges of dual 
citizenship and the tolerance is based on the ethno-cultural understanding of 
the nation. Polish emigrants abroad are allowed to maintain their original 
citizenship. Poland maintains citizenship relations with Polish emigrants due 
to the history of large-scale emigration from Poland. Górny et al. also 
acknowledged that such selective tolerance brings the issue to the forefront 
of political debates when the foreign citizens residing in Poland do not have 
such a right. Different tolerance between emigrants and immigrants is also 
practiced in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (148).  
A scholar in German citizenship studies, Green (2005: 947) coined 
the term "double standard" to refer to Germany's policy towards dual 
citizenship. Similar to Poland, Germany allowed dual citizenship based on 
ethnic preferential. Although Germany upheld the principle of a single 
citizenship, the state allowed dual citizenship to German children born to bi-
national parents, ethnic Germans abroad and refugees from Germany's 
former eastern territories. The contradiction between theory and practice is 
explained by Green by referring to the "ethnocultural nature of its 
citizenship" (924–925). These two concepts—"selective tolerance" and 
"double standard"—could be applied in the examined case of Taiwan. Dual 
citizenship among birth citizens is tolerated, but not naturalised citizens. 
Dual citizenship among ordinary citizens is tolerated but not politicians.  
 The Taiwanese government is utilising another approach to encourage 
brain gain—providing exemptions for its dual citizens to hold public office. 
In principle, Article 20 of the 2000 Nationality Act stated that "A citizen of 
the Republic of China who has obtained the citizenship of a foreign country 
shall not hold public office in the Republic of China." The exemptions are 
only applicable if they have rare or highly valuable expertise and their jobs 
are not concerned with national secrets. Among those who are eligible 
include presidents of public universities, public school teachers, research 
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fellows, employees of public enterprises and professionals (Chiu and Wu 
2000). Single allegiance prevents skilled emigrants from holding high 
public position thus hampers Taiwan's brain gain drive. In Academia Sinica, 
Taiwan's top research institute, five of the centre's 22 directors hold foreign 
passports in 1995 (Los Angeles Times 28 March 1995). 
 
 
TAIWANESE CITIZENSHIP REGIME: IMMIGRANTS' 
STRUGGLE FOR DUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHT 
 
In December 2012, the Taiwanese controversies surrounding the issue of 
dual citizenship were brought up to the forefront of political debates. 
Controversy surrounding dual citizenship has persistently being a thorny 
issue for the politics of Taiwan partly due to the existence of overseas 
delegates to its legislative body. During a public hearing of the Legislative 
Yuan, Legislator Hsiao Bi-khim proposed amendments in Section 9 of the 
Nationality Act, which would do away with the renunciation requirement 
for foreigners seeking naturalisation. The proposal was initiated as a 
response to two recent cases of Taiwanese spouses, whose application for 
Taiwanese citizenship was rejected after they had renounced their Pakistani 
citizenship. The decision of the Ministry of the Interior rendered the two 
applicants stateless (Taipei Times 15 December 2012). 
The inequality of access to dual citizenship is a part of the elongated 
exclusion of long-term residents from the Taiwanese citizenry. Since the 
ROC citizenship institution was based on jus sanguinis as the principle of 
awarding citizenship, understandably it was very difficult for non-Chinese 
nationals to become citizens of Taiwan (Cheng 2003: 102). The revised 
Nationality Act of 2000 did not change the status quo. Non-nationals still 
found it difficult to obtain Taiwanese citizenship. The requirements of 
naturalisation were set very high. The applicants had to be over 20 years of 
age, to have fulfilled five years of residence in the ROC, to be without 
criminal records, and to be economically independent (Article 3 of the 
Nationality Act of 2000 as printed in Chiu and Wu 2000). Nevertheless, the 
residential requirement was shorter (three years) if the applicant's parents 
were Chinese, the applicant's spouse was Chinese, or the applicant was 
adopted by an ROC citizen. Three years of domicile was required for the 
local-born children of foreigners to claim naturalisation (Article 4). 
Naturalisation was the only means to Taiwanese citizenship for 
foreigners. Second generation local-born foreigners were entitled to 
naturalisation provided that both of their parents were born in the ROC. An 
alien resident of at least 10 years standing was eligible to claim 
IJAPS, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1–33, 2015         Liberalising Dual Citizenship 
10 
naturalisation (Article 5). Automatic citizenship was only awarded to a 
person whose father or mother was a national of the ROC. According to the 
revised law, ROC citizenship was transmitted to a person one of whose 
parents was a ROC citizen. There was no element of jus soli except for a 
person who was born in the PRC with unknown parents or who was 
stateless (Article 2). 
There was no birthright citizenship for foreigners born in the ROC. 
Naturalisation was the only means to Taiwanese citizenship for foreigners 
(Cheng 2003: 92). The limitations of the law were described by historian 
Allen Chun, in the following terms:  
 
"In the long view of things, while these revised laws were 
implemented to accommodate the flow of foreign labour for 
purposes of residence, they did not radically alter existing laws 
with regard to dual citizenship, and the inability of non-Chinese 
to gain permanent residence for purposes of citizenship" (Chun 
2002: 119). 
 
The major reason of denying dual citizenship to foreigners seeking 
naturalisation is to prevent a mass influx of foreign migrants and preserve 
the sense of a local identity. The strong articulation of cultural nationalism 
in the Taiwanese nation limits the application of the notion of 
multiculturalism (Chun 2002: 119). Many foreigners, who married local 
citizens, have established a strong connection with the island. While the 
normal requirements for naturalisation are "reasonable"—meet certain 
residential and financial criteria, pass a Chinese language test, pass a health 
examination and pass a background check—the need to renounce foreign 
citizenship is not sensible. The historical fact that Taiwan allows dual 
citizenship for its own citizens is used by the opponents to argue for their 
cause (Taiwan Today 3 May 2010). 
The arguments are also presented from the positive viewpoint:  
generating economic development. Dual citizenship would encourage 
resident foreigners to settle permanently and to contribute economically. 
This argument is based on the rationale that citizens of developed nations do 
not give up their citizenship for something less. Many resident foreigners 
have already settled in the ROC and set up local businesses. Businesses 
people especially those from a rich and developed Western state, are 
unwilling to naturalise as ROC citizens. These entrepreneurs contribute to 
foreign exchange and entrepreneurial capital. According to Taiwan Today, 
an online news agency, more than 90 percent of those who chose ROC 
citizenship came from Southeast Asia (Taiwan Today 3 May 2010).  
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Most naturalised Southeast Asians involve female immigrant spouses. 
The wave of migration involving female immigrant spouses from Southeast 
Asia (mainly from Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Cambodia) had started since the 1970s and 1980s. With the lifting of the 
travel ban to China in 1987 and the opening of Taiwan to Mainland Chinese 
visitors in 1990, there was a second wave of female spouses' migration from 
the mainland. With the increasing number of female immigrant spouses, 
Taiwan was said to be a country with "feminised" or marriage immigration 
(Cheng 2008: 2–5). The prohibition of dual citizenship for female 
immigrant spouses is totally different from the practice towards ROC 
nationals (Wang and Bélanger 2008: 94–95). Female immigrant spouses 
from less developed countries are more willing to naturalise (Hsia 2009: 
32). Female immigrant spouses are considered as foreigners regardless of 
their period of residence in Taiwan and the period of their marriage. Due to 
the strict citizenship and immigration policies of the ROC, female 
immigrant spouses face hardships and disadvantages in their societal 
integration (Hsia 2008: 192–193). 
Female immigrant spouses are portrayed as a "socio-economically 
disadvantaged and inferior class" (Wang and Bélanger 2008: 92). Often 
regarded as "Other" by the Taiwanese legislators and society, they are 
subject to the patriarchal jus sanguinis principle of the Nationality Act (guo 
ji fa). Their citizenship status depended on their marital status and they do 
not have any identity of their own. For those who are reluctant to give up 
their former citizenship, they remain as residents and legalise their stay in 
Taiwan through their husbands or children (98). To better facilitate the 
integration of these Southeast Asian female immigrant spouses and their bi-
national children, NGOs and the government have developed various 
support schemes to empower them (103).   
Liberalists have argued that dual citizenship will ease integration. The 
acceptance of dual citizenship among immigrants facilitates naturalisation 
(Spiro 2010: 117). Liberal theorists are not in favour of the renunciation 
requirement because the real cost of renouncing birth right citizenship 
involves sentimental interests (2010: 128). Many international scholars have 
argued that the greatest barrier to integration lies in the restrictive 
naturalisation policy. Prohibition on dual citizenship made naturalisation 
less attractive for immigrants. To make naturalisation conducive to 
integration, the criteria should be made more attractive by abolishing the 
dual citizenship ban. In other words, the best method for integration is dual 
citizenship (Davy 2005: 141). Citizenship is a means for the empowerment 
of migrants. Formulation of a model of citizenship that is capable of 
empowering migrants should be able to "secure the position of immigrants 
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in both sending and receiving countries, without necessarily obliging them 
to have their former rights and freedoms withdrawn" (Içduygu and Senay 
2008: 308). In other words, dual citizenship is a vehicle to secure the 
position of immigrants in two worlds. 
 Dual citizenship should be a tool of empowerment of the 
marginalised class to "promote a more inclusive form of citizenship" rather 
than as a convenience tool of the privileged class (Hsia 2009: 26). 
Advocating political recognition of group differences, multiculturalists call 
for additional rights for disadvantaged groups such as minorities or 
immigrants. Additional rights whether in the form of special representation, 
affirmative action or self-government are necessary to bring the 
disadvantaged groups on an equal footing with the majority groups. This 
explains why multiculturalists favour dual citizenship for immigrants. Dual 
citizenship is a tool of recognition of cultural difference and political 
participation (Janoski and Gran 2002: 22).   
 It is this form of citizenship, which is lacking in Taiwan. An 
independent observer, Whittle (2012) suggested that:  
 
"The renunciation condition brings absolutely no benefit to 
Taiwan, either tangible or intangible. But it is severely unfair 
and discriminatory against new immigrants who wish to 
become fully integrated into Taiwan's society and enjoy the full 
civic rights that should be accorded to every law-abiding and 
tax-paying member of a society."  
 
Hsia, a prolific writer on immigrant movements in Taiwan, believed that 
marriage migration could challenge the traditional concept of citizenship 
and eventually garner considerable force and lead to the realisation of 
multiple citizenship.  
 
"Compared to migrant workers, marriage migrants are in a 
more advantaged position to challenge Taiwan's exclusionary 
model of citizenship because the nature of transnational 
marriages involves citizens from different nation-states and 
their children are the direct result of cross-border migration" 
(2009: 41). 
  
Hsia's anticipation is reasonable given that the international trend is 
moving towards toleration of dual citizenship for spouses and children. The 
European states have come to realise—after the conclusion of the 1963 
"Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on 
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Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality"—that strict 
avoidance of multiple allegiance is problematic. The main principle of 
Article 1 of the 1963 Convention was finally amended in 1993 to take into 
consideration of cases of mixed marriages. According to the Second 
Protocol to the 1963 Convention, dual citizenship is to be tolerated for 
spouses of different nationalities and children born of mixed marriages. 
Each of the spouses of a mixed marriage should have the right to acquire the 
citizenship of the other without losing his or her former citizenship. 
Children born of mixed marriages should also be entitled to the citizenship 
of both their parents (Vink and Groot 2010: 723–724). Toleration of dual 
citizenship for spouses and children of mixed marriages is reiterated when 
the Council of Europe initiated a new European Convention on Nationality 
in 1997 (Article 14). 
 
 
CITIZENSHIP REGIME IN THE PRC: EMIGRANTS' STRUGGLE 
FOR DUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHT 
 
The PRC's citizenship campaign has started around two decades ago. In 
March 1999, several representatives proposed to abolish the single 
citizenship policy at the meeting of the Ninth Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is the national advisory body 
(Yang and Yin Hui 2006: 30). After the initial rejection by the Ministry of 
Public Security, overseas Chinese in European countries continued to 
intensify their campaign—by expressing their views to the National People's 
Congress, the People's Consultative Congress and the Office of Overseas 
Chinese Affairs. Such expressions were widely circulated in various 
national and international media as well as in online forums. Since then, 
worldwide overseas Chinese organisations have called for the recognition of 
dual citizenship. The North Chinese Community of Canada and several 
Chinese organisations in New Zealand, for examples, sought to challenge 
the policy in 2003 and 2004 respectively (Liu 2010:189).  
Multiple allegiances are not acceptable in the Chinese citizenship 
principle in the past and present. Chen Yujie, director of the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) of the State Council, during his visit to 
Britain in 2005, stated that the PRC has to take into consideration of the 
interests of overseas Chinese. Their loyalty would be questionable if dual 
allegiance were allowed. Facilitating their visitation and reunification with 
their families were not seen as sufficient factors to modify the existing 
policy. The director of OCAO regarded the decision as "reasonable and 
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rational and completely in accordance with the International Law and the 
common practice in most countries" (People's Daily 9 June 2005).  
In March 2005, another similar proposal was submitted by the China 
Democratic National Construction Association to the PRC government. In 
its proposal to the CPPCC, the Association argued that dual citizenship is 
advantageous to China in terms of bringing "more talents, technology, 
money and management experience to China." The request was turned 
down (Xiao and Guo 2006: 587). The same reply was given by Wang Ping, 
the deputy director of the domestic department of the OCAO during her 
visit with overseas Chinese in Vancouver in 2009. Members of the Senior 
Chinese Society of Vancouver were concerned with their retirement and 
asked to be allowed to regain their Chinese citizenship, to invest in China 
and to enjoy senior welfare benefits in China (Crienglish 18 November 
2009). Despite the continuous official rejections, the overseas Chinese 
campaign continues. 
 The new generation of returned migrants, however, could not 
comprehend why the policy, which was designed for the old generation of 
overseas Chinese, should apply to them as well. If overseas Chinese were 
seen as a liability to the Chinese government during the Cold War period, 
Chinese diaspora in the 21st century has become an asset. Compared to the 
old migrants, the new migrants (xinyimin) are in the position to contribute 
towards the nation's social economic development due to their economic 
resources and working experiences in developed countries. Moreover, the 
new migrants are definitely more patriotic since they were born and 
educated in China (Liu 2010:184–186). 
The Chinese emigrants sought to present their proposal in an 
attractive way by arguing from the patriotic perspective. They carry the 
nationalist tune and appeal to Chinese nationalism: dual citizenship would 
be "in the mutual interests of the Chinese state or people and the Chinese 
overseas" (ibid. 2010: 189). Naturally, this was not agreeable by the Chinese 
writers. Liu argued that the genuine reasons are "facilitating transnational 
mobility and the diaspora's interests" (189). Wang et al. (2006: 297–298) 
also agreed that the return of overseas students and professionals is not 
motivated by patriotic motives but by promising career opportunities in 
China. Chinese economic development is the key factor in enticing them to 
return. Losing Chinese citizenship has great implications for Chinese 
returnees or haigui as it means losing local household registration 
(hukuo).Without their household registration, haigui lost their entitlements 
to social welfare, medical insurance and public education in China (2006: 
302).  
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 The right to dual citizenship in the PRC may only benefit a special 
class of citizens: the Chinese emigrants. The Chinese case illustrates the 
inequitable demand from the well off students and professional migrants, 
who have the opportunity to go abroad and to acquire foreign citizenship. I 
agree with Bloemraad (2004: 389) that high classes of the society have more 
opportunity to have multiple citizenship. If the dual citizenship restriction 
were liberalised, only the wealthier group would benefit. 
Research conducted by Vanessa Fong among her Chinese students in 
the U.S. found that they regarded foreign countries as "paradise" (2011: 10). 
More and more students choose to study abroad in developed countries 
hoping to gain access to social, cultural and legal citizenship of the countries 
while retaining their access to citizenship rights in China (5). Chinese 
overseas treasure their home country citizenship and they are "loyal" to their 
ancestral home. Loyalty in this context refers to family loyalty, rather than 
political loyalty. "Filial nationalism" plays a more dominant role in 
explaining the "subjective loyalty" of overseas students rather than 
ethnocultural nationalism.   
 
"Chinese youth in my study retained a strong sense of loyalty to 
China based on the idea of an imagined community but on the 
idea of an imagined family in which China was identified with 
a long-suffering parent who deserved the filial devotion of her 
children" (Fong 2011: 52). 
 
Despite leaving their homeland for years, many Chinese maintain their 
Chinese cultural identity. The sharing of common sentiments is a logical 
consequence as patriotism or nationalism has been reinforced deliberately 
by the Communist government in China. The Chinese state hopes to claim a 
national identity beyond its territorial border while encouraging new 
migrants to contribute without having to physically return to China (Wu 
1994: 187). As a result, all who see themselves as Chinese immediately 
identify themselves with these two sentiments—a sense of connectedness 
with the destiny of China and a sense of fulfilment stemming from 
practicing the superior Chinese cultural heritage (149). It is questionable if 
the affiliation with Chinese traditions had in fact encouraged the return of 
overseas Chinese since "the existence of a superior Chinese culture is, at 
best, a myth." David Wu supported his opinion by adding that: 
  
"The Chinese people and Chinese culture have been 
constantly amalgamating, restructuring, reinventing, and 
reinterpreting themselves, the seemingly static Chinese 
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culture has been in a continuous process of assigning 
important new meanings about being Chinese" (1994: 151). 
 
The process of "indigenisation" has taken place in the receiving countries. 
Different political, economic and social context must be taken into 
consideration when discussing the relationship between Chinese migrants 
and cultural identity (Cheng Xi 2007: 52). The Chinese diaspora might 
share certain social characteristics such as dialect, place of origin, political 
belief and similar surname, but their sub-ethnic identity is determined by the 
"native-place identity" (Lin 2007: 144). As Dittmer and Kim (1993) noted, 
the diasporic Chinese adapt various identities in line with the changing 
situations. Ethnic, national, local, cultural and class identities coexist. In 
their words, if the diasporic Chinese were to relate their identities with 
China, "It is now the Han Chinese nation and cultural identity, not the PRC 
state or state/nation identity, that is the primary locus of overseas Chinese 
sentiments and loyalty" (278). According to them, the benchmark of 
Chinese identity is the performance of Chinese rites and ritual. 
 
"One is and becomes Chinese and achieves Chinese cultural 
identity (wen) by understanding and performing key rituals 
associated with the life cycle—the rites of birth, marriage, 
death, and ancestor—in the proper and accepted manner. In 
essence, one becomes Chinese by acting Chinese" (Dittmer 
and Kim 1993: 256). 
 
In a research conducted on Haiguinet, an online community of Chinese 
returning migrants, Liu (2012) showed that Chinese migrants viewed 
citizenship as a registration or administration tool, which was not equivalent 
to their identity and cultural belonging. Accordingly, they did not find it 
necessary to retain their Chinese citizenship to maintain their cultural 
identity as a Chinese. In other words, "losing Chinese citizenship does not 
mean losing their Chinese culture or Chineseness" (56). It is less likely that 
overseas Chinese identify themselves politically with the state but the issue 
of loyalty is made complicated by the state's nation-building ideology. The 
Chinese state-sponsored education, which emphasises patriotism, civic 
duties and the responsibility to remain loyal, has underestimated the 
importance of individual rights (Fong 2011: 53).   
 For those migrants who could not enjoy dual citizenship, their 
selection of citizenship is based on a careful calculation on "the costs and 
the gains of different citizenship" (Liu 2012: 39). The rationales for 
choosing a foreign citizenship—especially U.S. citizenship—over Chinese 
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citizenship are understandably sensible and realistic. Besides offering a 
competitive position in the global labour market, western citizenship 
enabling the Chinese to earn developed-world-level salaries in China 
compared to the local employees. The convenience of international travel, 
children's education and career opportunities, and protection from political 
uncertainties in mainland China are some of the benefits conferred by 
citizenship of a developed nation (Liu 2012: 40–43). Liu coined the term 
"selective citizenship" to illustrate the careful making of citizenship choices 
among ordinary Chinese migrants when dual citizenship is unreachable (Liu 
2012: 36). As long as transnational mobility is a reality, this conception—
the selection of citizenship based on calculation of benefits—could not be 
avoided (39). Liu (2012) showed that "migrants and returnees construct 
their hybrid identities while remaining flexible and selective with nationality 
and citizenship in order to maximise their transnational mobility and 
individual autonomy" (60). 
 
 
PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES OF THE MIGRANTS 
 
Unable to challenge the strict single citizenship principle, Chinese migrants, 
unlike the privileged Taiwanese and Hong Kongers, are adopting a new 
strategy to maximise their rights. The tactical approach of "one family, two 
systems," best explains how the migrants survive the single citizenship 
principle and protect their transnational mobility at the same time. Through 
this system, one spouse retains his or her Chinese citizenship while the other 
applies for a western citizenship (Liu 2012: 45).  
 Some Chinese returnees try hiding their dual citizenship status 
through the loopholes in China's entry and exit administration. They 
concealed their intention to emigrate and they returned to the mainland via 
Hong Kong or Macau through a special entry-exit permit. The strategy 
enables the dual nationals to pass through the Chinese immigration check-
point without leaving any records of their foreign passports. Upon returning 
to China, their hukuo status was reinstated and they continued to access all 
the rights such as the retirement fund, unemployment insurance, housing 
subsidies and others (Ho 2011: 653). 
On the other hand, Taiwanese couples are embracing the trend of 
getting citizenship of a western country, especially U.S. citizenship for their 
baby. U.S. citizenship opens up the gate to social welfare, to the possibility 
of emigration from Taiwan and to the opportunity for green card application 
for their parents. Having an American baby is often regarded as an 
achievement by the Taiwanese society. This explains the popular 
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phenomenon among Taiwanese women going to the U.S. to give birth with 
the aim to acquire dual citizenship for their child (Lien 2006: 7–9). Lien 
argues that the main reason behind the acquisition of a developed country 
citizenship is that of protection. Lien describes the act as akin to getting an 
insurance policy so that "they will have the best situation, no matter what 
happens" (96). 
 Many Taiwanese citizens prefer to return to Taiwan to enjoy the 
affordable health care and cheaper health insurance while choose to have 
their child educated in the U.S. In the U.S. alone, there are more than 
300,000 children born to undocumented residents every year. In an 
emerging strategy of "birth tourism," parents typically choose to give birth 
abroad, to secure a foreign passport and economic opportunities for their 
child. This trend is also observable in Hong Kong. Mainland Chinese 
mothers, in order to evade China's single citizenship policy, are immigrating 
to Hong Kong to give birth at the rate of above 35,000 per year (The Epoch 
Time 12 March 2013). 
Hong Kong residents are also not left out in the pursuit of a better 
transnational mobility. In Ong's notion of "flexible citizenship," 
professionals and highly skilled Chinese migrants have sought to make the 
most of the existing citizenship constraints by selecting different countries 
for different purposes: residence, investments, work and family relocation 
(2008: 112). Adopting the flexible approach, Hong Kong residents continue 
to work in the same place: Hong Kong; sent their families to another place: 
western countries; and set up their business abroad. At the same time, they 
acquire multiple passports, second homes, overseas bank accounts and most 
importantly the flexibility to move around the globe (2008: 214).  
All these approaches practiced in "Greater China" are best described 
as "transnational citizenship." Transnational citizenship is coined by 
Bauböck to refer to political membership in a nation-state with the citizens 
having social ties across state borders. As a result of the expansion of 
international communications, globalisation and the development of a global 
economy, many migrants maintain economic or political ties with their 
home countries (Faist 2004: 7 and 10). In Aihwa Ong's words "globalization 
has made economic calculation a major element in diasporan subjects" 
choice of citizenship, as well as in the ways nation-states redefine 
immigration laws (1999: 112). 
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DEBATING THE STATES' RESPONSES TO DUAL                
CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 
  
Judging from the state practice, dual citizenship as a human right does not 
find resonance in China and Taiwan. The political cultures of Taiwan and 
China are incompatible with the liberalist approach of citizenship. Two 
explanations could be offered as to why the lobbying and protests have 
virtually no impact on the PRC. First, the Western perspective on 
citizenship centres on civil and individual rights, which are absent from the 
Chinese citizenship tradition. According to the Western concept of natural 
rights, "rights spring from the dignity of the person." The Chinese idea of 
rights, on the other hand, is founded on "the relation between individual and 
collective interests." Chinese citizenship is different from the western idea 
due to the official Chinese collectivist understanding of rights under the 
authoritarian government (Keane 2001:4). In conceptualising citizenship, 
the West emphasises the rights and participation of citizens. Westerners 
perceive citizenship as a legal status from which rights are derived. 
However, political participation is absent in China (although not in 
contemporary Taiwan), which makes it almost impossible to apply the 
Western concept of citizenship (Solinger 2010:4). 
For the Chinese state, citizenship is not a natural right of man but a 
benefit conferred by the state. Citizenship is not viewed as a tool of 
individual empowerment but as a nation-building device. Through 
citizenship, the state aims to foster cultural development by requiring its 
citizens to participate in social programmes. In contrast to the western 
thinkers, who typically emphasise participatory citizenship, Chinese 
reformers and revolutionaries, such as Sun Yat-sen, believed that the 
interests of the nation were more important than the rights of the individual. 
Thus the nation should have absolute freedom, rather than the individual 
members (Keane 2001: 2–3). 
Confucian tradition combined with Marxist thought influence the 
modern Chinese conception of rights, which placed little value in individual 
rights. The absence of individual rights is attributed to the long established 
Confucian tradition with its emphasis on collectivism (Christensen 1992: 
487).  In line with its status as a Marxist-Leninist state, China adopted the 
socialist view concerning individual rights. Individual rights were rejected 
because Marxism regarded them as capitalist tools. Rights were used by the 
bourgeoisie to achieve its class goals and to protect its class interests. Thus, 
individuals in capitalist society would further their own conflicting personal 
interests to the detriment of the interests of society as a whole (1992: 496–
497). The natural rights theory has been subject to criticism by Marxists and 
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communitarians. Though Chinese Confucianism and socialism reject natural 
rights, rights which were in harmony with the collectivist and socialist 
Chinese order do exist. Instead of natural rights, the Chinese government 
emphasizes collective rights, derived from society (1992: 502).  
 Second, the Chinese diaspora has little impact on the policy making 
of the PRC. The Chinese diaspora has remained as "a large passive factor" 
in both China's international relations and the domestic affairs. The PRC's 
shift towards a single citizenship policy in the 1950s demonstrated how the 
nation-state prioritises its own interests above those of the overseas Chinese. 
Beginning in 1955, the PRC called for a sudden change in its dual 
citizenship policy during the Afro-Asia Conference in Bandung. Dual 
citizenship among Chinese diasporas was seen as a liability to China when 
the PRC was seeking to establish diplomatic relationships. The PRC 
prohibits dual citizenship to avoid inter-state conflicts with Southeast Asian 
states, in its quest for diplomatic recognition. Liu addressed the logic behind 
the passive role of overseas Chinese as follows: 
 
"Apart from the fragmentation of the diaspora communities 
per se, the Chinese state's centrality in defining national and 
security interests and its resilient capacities in domesticating 
(potential) diplomatic problems relating to the Chinese 
overseas has prevented the diaspora from playing any 
proactive role in the homeland's foreign policy processes" 
(2010: 178). 
 
The opposition forces dispersed around the globe and were not strong 
enough to challenge the existing policy. Their arguments are relatively 
weak. Their concealed motives renewed PRC suspicions about their 
intentions. The campaigners are no longer Chinese nationals. Even if the 
single citizenship policy were maintained, they would definitely choose the 
citizenship of a developed state. In the eyes of the PRC government, the 
citizens-turned-migrants have no stake in the decision-making machinery 
but this is not to say that the Chinese Communist Party has no interests in 
them. The overseas Chinese "has not lost the whole battle" because China is 
increasingly stepping up its efforts to encourage their return (Liu 2010:193). 
The Chinese government is unwilling to respond to citizens' 
movement. Perhaps there are little incentives to do so. There is virtually 
nothing to gain by liberalising the dual citizenship provision. What could 
China possibly secure by maintaining the narrow definition of loyalty of its 
former nationals when it could adopt transnational nationalism? As 
discussed above, the campaign conforms neither to the political interests nor 
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the economic benefits of the communist government. The increasing 
numbers of overseas Chinese and their economic significances are not the 
sufficient factors to challenge the state's citizenship policy. This is not to 
suggest that maintaining vibrant economic links has not been a continuous 
concern for the Chinese government. Rather, competitive or open economy 
would definitely attract more potential investors, regardless of their 
ethnicity.  
A clear understanding of the policy debate could only be 
comprehended if there is a clear analysis of the actors involved, of the 
governments, of the different periods and of the broader population 
involved. In Taiwan, there are the old and new KMT, the opposition party, 
the various ethnic groups whereas in the PRC, the focus is only on the ruling 
party. The Chinese policy is an unpopular policy imposed from above by the 
authoritarian government and it is not widely supported by overseas 
Chinese. It is hardly comparable to anti-dual citizenship policies (against 
immigrants) in Taiwan, which was built on popular support.  
In the case of Taiwan, having rights in two countries is not attuned to 
two developments: (1) the growth of Taiwanese nationalism; and (2) the 
uncertain international status of Taiwan. Due to the development of a 
Taiwanese identity, there is an increased sense of belonging to Taiwan and 
ultimately the desire to make Taiwan as the sole home country. Dual 
allegiance is seen as incompatible with this development (Los Angeles 
Times 28 March 1995). The growth of Taiwanese nationalism necessitates 
the foundation of a Taiwanese-based citizenry which required undivided 
loyalty. This means that citizenship is available to those who could identify 
themselves with Taiwan political future. Through constitutional 
amendments in the 1990s, the ROC portrayed itself as the government of the 
Taiwanese people. It was the local people rather than the mainland people 
who determined the legitimacy of the ROC regime. Only Taiwanese have 
the right to elect the governing regime: members of the Legislative Yuan, 
the National Assembly, the president and the vice president. Since elections 
signified the growth of local identity, it was imperative to limit this right to 
those who could identify themselves with Taiwanese identity (Chao and Liu 
2007: 202–203).  
When employing the term "Taiwanese national identity," a clear 
distinction needs to be made between the authoritarian period (from 1945 to 
1987) and the following pluralisation period in Taiwan. Parallel with the 
efforts to develop a sense of Chineseness among the population of Taiwan 
during the authoritarian period, Taiwanese citizenship was inclusive towards 
overseas Chinese. Taiwan also abandoned its former Chinese identity when 
the constitutional reform re-defined Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matzu as 
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the de facto territory where its actual jurisdiction resides. The local 
population are no longer considered as Chinese. They are Taiwanese. In the 
official usage, the term "Chinese" now refers exclusively to people from the 
PRC (ibid. 2007: 203). The development of a new political identity as a 
result of the democratisation process, coupled with the extension of 
citizenship rights and the limitation of the ROC territorial sovereignty to its 
actual jurisdiction, enabled the nurturing of a local national identity. On the 
basis of this new political identity, the ROC was able to claim an 
independent international identity. Democratisation also enabled Taiwan to 
create an international identity, independent from the Chinese identity of the 
PRC regime. The creation of this identity was much needed, especially 
when Taiwan was facing international isolation after it had lost its United 
Nations (UN) seat. The introduction of democratic values by the 
government made international acceptance possible (Wong 2001: 190–191). 
 As Taiwan is not recognised by most nations, securing loyalty from 
its new citizens is central to the legitimacy of the state. Taiwanese people 
expect "New Taiwanese" (Xin Taiwanren) to explicitly express that they 
love Taiwan. According to Lee Teng-hui, "New Taiwanese" are those who 
"are willing to fight for the prosperity and survival of their country, 
regardless of when they or their forebears arrived on Taiwan and regardless 
of their provincial heritage or native language" (Lee as cited in Ngeow 
2010: 160). Loving Taiwan is the decisive criterion to be a Xin Taiwanren. 
 
"The slogan 'Love Taiwan' captures the mainstream ideology 
and political sign that can be used to identify 'we' and 'they.'  
Situated in this social context, the immigrants are 
constructed as 'Others' who need to be Taiwanised" (Wang 
and Bélanger 2008: 93). 
 
In the process of constructing its own national identity, Taiwan has to, in the 
words of Lucie Cheng, "other-ise the Chinese that it originally purported to 
represent" (Cheng: 2003: 98).  
It is difficult to imagine that the immigrants would be allowed to 
share the advantages of dual citizenship when PRC citizens (who are 
considered as compatriots by the Constitution of the ROC) do not even 
enjoy such privileges. Taiwan may not be willing to embrace outsiders 
partly because of its unresolved national identity and partly because of the 
development of a de-sinicised national identity. If people of the Taiwan 
Area hold PRC passports, they would have their household registration in 
the Taiwan Area cancelled. A person could not have household registrations 
in both the "Mainland Area" and "Taiwan Area" at the same time. Losing 
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such a status would have implied the loss of the rights of voting, recall, 
initiative, referendum, serving military service or holding public offices, and 
other rights (Article 9 (1) the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area 31 July 1992). Even with 
authorised permission, the people of the Mainland Area could not access 
citizenship rights without a household registration in the Taiwan Area 
(Article 21). 
 Loyalty thus becomes an important criterion in strengthening 
Taiwanese national identity. The fact that Taiwan has allowed dual 
citizenship among its own citizens does not bewilder the value of loyalty. 
Government officials holding green cards were widely criticised for their 
lack of loyalty. According to the ROC Nationality Act, government officials 
were not allowed to hold dual citizenship but they were not prohibited by 
the Act from holding a foreign green card. Their loyalties were questioned, 
and they suffered from the loss of personal reputation. More importantly, 
such incidents were used by the opposition party to attack their reputations 
and gain support from voters. There were public debates on the question 
whether or not these public officials should be removed from their positions. 
Government officials were constitutionally not allowed to hold dual 
citizenship but they were not prohibited by ROC Nationality Act from 
holding a foreign green card (China Stakes 23 June 2008). 
The green card controversy became a crisis during the presidential 
election campaign in March 2008. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-
jeou was found to be in possession of a U.S. green card, and this opportunity 
was used by the opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to 
attack the KMT. The fact that he still held a green card when he served as 
President Chiang Ching-kuo's secretary caused the DPP to accuse him of 
disloyalty. Ma Ying-jeou believed that having a green card did not affect his 
loyalty to Taiwan. He claimed that "obtaining a green card has nothing to do 
with the issue of loyalty. It is only a way to live or travel in the U.S." 
(Taipei Times 31 January 2008). 
However, the DPP claimed that having a green card enabled officials 
to flee overseas in case of political chaos in Taiwan. The possibility of 
escaping to a safe haven was viewed as an example of disloyalty to Taiwan 
(The China Post 22 March 2008). The debate continued after Ma Ying-jeou 
won the presidential election. Government officials from his KMT party 
were found to be holding either a U.S. green card or foreign citizenship. 
Dual loyalty controversy resurfaced in March 2008 when a former KMT 
legislator, Diane Lee, was found to have U.S. citizenship, which she 
claimed she had renounced (The China Post 9 January 2009).  
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These cases proved to be an embarrassment to the ruling KMT 
government. The holding of dual citizenship among elected representatives 
was viewed negatively as it involved the question of loyalty. Elected 
representatives had access to national secrets, and there were fears that they 
might commit espionage. Conflicts of interest would have arisen if the 
legislators participated in debating a bill which involved their second 
countries. According to an editorial in the China Post, dual loyalty was not 
the main reason behind the recent controversy.  Rather, the controversy was 
motivated by political factors. Diana Lee's case, it was claimed, was 
politicised and exaggerated by the DPP in order to undermine the popularity 
of the KMT. Embarrassment to the ruling party would divert national 
attention from the DPP's internal crisis in which former President Chen 
Shui-bian was alleged to be involved in corruption cases. The fact that the 
issue caused a major upheaval among the electorate could be explained 
within the context of the political culture in Taiwan (The China Post 17 
January 2009). 
Dual citizenship is at odds with the political culture in Taiwan. 
Taiwanese officials' acquisition of dual citizenship or a permanent residency 
of a foreign country is not tolerated by the growing sense of Taiwanese 
identity. The examined case of the KMT politicians demonstrates that the 
state of Taiwan selectively does not tolerate dual citizenship. The discussion 
above shows that the latest strong expression of selective (in)tolerance 
found its outlet in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. 
Following the political crisis caused by Diana Lee's case, the KMT 
and DPP submitted their own proposals to the Legislative Yuan calling for 
an investigation of the second citizenship of all the 113 legislators and also 
high-ranking officials of the central government. Their motions were passed 
in May 2008 (Taiwan News 24 May 2008). In June 2008, the Ministry of 
Civil Service proposed a bill to the Legislative Yuan to require all civil 
servants, including political appointees, to undergo background checks 
before taking office. The bill was suggested as a result of the continuous 
DPP attacks on the loyalty of some KMT officials. The DPP insisted that no 
Cabinet members should hold foreign citizenship or a green card. Prior to 
this proposal, only government officials in the area of national security 
needed to undergo security checks (The China Post 12 June 2008). In March 
2009, KMT and DPP legislators put forward two separate bills to the 
Legislative Yuan, proposing to ban those with foreign residency from 
holding government positions. DPP legislators also suggested that officials 
should renounce their second citizenship within six months after their 
inauguration rather than within the existing period of one year (Taiwan 
News 7 March 2009).  
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In 2001, a further amendment to Article 20 prohibited members of the 
National Assembly, legislators, public officers directly elected in 
municipalities, cities or townships, as well as village and borough chiefs 
from obtaining foreign citizenship. If these public officers were found to 
have obtained a foreign citizenship, they were to be released from their 
posts by the competent authorities. The law permitted them to assume 
public office if they applied to renounce their foreign citizenship before 
taking office and had successfully renounced their foreign citizenship within 
one year of their inauguration. Failure to do so would result in removal from 
their positions (Chiu and Wu 2001). 
 Diane Lee resigned from the KMT in December 2009 and later 
resigned from the Legislative Yuan to ease the public pressure. After 
confirming the validity of her citizenship in January 2010, the Central 
Election Commission (CEC) annulled her election to the Taipei City 
Council and Legislative Yuan and cancelled all her election certificates 
(Taiwan Today News 11 February 2009). Diane Lee was later charged with 
fraud and forgery for violating the Nationality Act and was sentenced to two 
years in prison in February 2010.  Following her case, more dual citizenship 
cases among KMT officials were discovered. The CEC terminated the 
elected positions of KMT Kaohsiung City councillor Huang Shao-ting and 
Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator George Liu for holding U.S. citizenship 
during their term of public office (Taipei Times 24 March 2010). 
The beginning of 2013 witnessed a new phase of dual citizenship 
enforcement. In January, an amendment to the Civil Service Employment 
Act was passed by the Legislative Yuan, requiring all civil servants holding 
foreign citizenship to be dismissed. In addition, they must give back all the 
pay they have received from the government. Before this amendment, the 
Act only required the person involved to be fired. The rationale of the 
decision was that civil servants with dual citizenship are aware of the dual 
citizenship prohibition but choose to conceal it from the public. The 
amendment, thus, signals the government's position that dual citizenship is 
not tolerated among all civil servants. Civil servants, whose foreign 
citizenship has not been revealed, must make a choice between their 
citizenship and career (Taiwan News 4 January 2013).  
Similar to Taiwan, Hong Kong has also witnessed dual citizenship 
controversy involving the officialdom (Alex 2010: 62). In Hong Kong, 
following the public protest against the dual citizenship status of Donald 
Tsang, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR), the vice directors of HKSAR had to forfeit their green cards. In 
the PRC, the green card issue has not sparked off any public debate as the 
political awareness among middle class citizens is lower than those of 
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Taiwan and Hong Kong. According to Chinese laws, only PRC nationals 
can be appointed as government officials. It does not regulate whether or not 
they can have foreign residency. Many Chinese returnees who possessed 
foreign residency have been appointed to important positions. Whether or 
not this will cause dual loyalty conflicts remains to be seen (China Stakes 23 
June 2008). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has demonstrated that the political cultures of both states do not 
permit the adaptation of the liberalist approach. Whilst the liberalist 
approach seems to explain why dual citizenship is desirable for individuals, 
it is not entirely acceptable to the states of Taiwan and China. Liberalist 
approach overlooks the emotional cost of acquiring a foreign citizenship 
when identity and loyalty is concerned. In articulating a new political 
identity, Taiwan found it necessary to demand undivided loyalty. Taiwan's 
democratisation coupled with popular representation, competitive elections, 
a multi-party system and a free press have enhanced the practice of 
citizenship rights (Goldman and Perry 2002: 19; Rigger 2002: 370). Parallel 
to the development of Taiwan's civil society, Taiwanese national 
consciousness has given rise to the resulting political culture, which rejected 
dual allegiances. The foundation of Taiwanese civic nationalism is loyalty 
to the state and to the constitution. The importance of citizenship in the civic 
nationalist discourse is highly valued (Ngeow 2010: 152). It should be noted 
that there is a different theoretical application to each of the examined 
groups in the ROC: 1) Taiwanese emigrants (including officials); and 2) the 
immigrants. A liberalist approach is not applicable to the case of Taiwan 
and its arguments are not accepted by the government of Taiwan because of 
the political culture derived from the discourse of Taiwanese consciousness 
and New Taiwanese. This argument is applicable to the first group 
(Taiwanese emigrants and officials). For the second group, there is a 
different line of arguments. This article acknowledges the failure of 
liberalists' call for abolishing the requirement of renunciation and thus calls 
on the arguments of multiculturalists for granting dual citizenship to foreign 
immigrants in Taiwan. 
Dual citizenship as a right is a contested position in the Chinese 
citizenship tradition. The PRC which places the interests of the community 
before the interests of the individual, opposes the liberal prioritisation of the 
individual. The state stresses the obligations of citizenship over the rights of 
citizenship. As reiterated by Rigger, "Chinese political culture normalizes a 
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hierarchical relationship between individuals and the state, and inclines 
Chinese citizens to forfeit their private interests for the harmony of the 
society" (Rigger 2014: 48). The migrants however, have a different 
understanding of citizenship. They desire for dual belonging for the sake of 
maintaining family and ancestry ties while enhancing their mobility across 
the globe for a better future. They are strongly loyal to their family lineage 
and attached subjectively to cultural heritage more than the feeling of any 
political belonging. An American, who has lived in Taiwan for eight years, 
told me during a conference, "I do not feel any loyalty to the States. My 
loyalty lies with my family." Many immigrants in Taiwan also share the 
similar sentiment. The preservation of home country citizenship serves as 
bridges to facilitate their return for family visitation and reunion. The 
political element of citizenship may not be significant to the migrants but 
the absence of loyalty is an issue of great concern to Taiwan (as well as the 
PRC).  
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